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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONNIE RAY LUND, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
CASE NO. 16921 
vs. 
RALPH B. FOLEY, 
Defendant-Respondent 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order of Dismissal granted 
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, and 
entered in the above entitled matter on the 22nd day of 
January, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of Dismissal 
and a remand to the lower court for a full trial on the merits 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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or, in the alternative, for a reversal of the Order of 
Dismissal to the extent the same dismisses appellant's 
Complaint with prejudice so that appellant may refile 
appellant's cause of action pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant commenced this action for such compensatory 
damages as are reasonable in the premises by alleging that in 
January, 1971, appellant sustained severe lacerations when 
appellant fell through a storm glass window at appellant's 
residence (R.1). Appellant further alleged that respondent, 
while acting as appellant's attenting physician, undertook the 
removal of several glass fragments from appellant's body and 
to suture appellant's wounds (R.2). It was further alleged 
that respondent failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, 
and learning consistent with the standard of care normally 
rendered in the community and that as a direct and proximate 
result thereof, appellant was required to undergo surgery on 
the 28th day of January, 1977, for the removal of additional 
glass fragments discovered in the right side of appellant's 
chest (R.2). Appellant sought to recover damages for the 
additional medical expenses incurred by appellant and for the 
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extreme mental and emotional pain and suffering alleged to 
have been suffered by appellant (R.2). 
Respondent's Answer was filed on the 29th day of 
December, 1978 and the matter was at issue. 
On February 23, 1979, appellant filed a Request for 
Production of Documents (R.7), and on the 30th day of March, 
1979, appellant took the deposition of respondent and the 
respondent deposed appellant. 
A Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R.11,12-14) was filed 
by respondent on May 21, 1979 wherein respondent raised the 
issue of the applicable Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sunnnary 
Judgment (R.23-26) was filed on June 7, 1979 and by a 
Memorandum Decision (R.15) the lower court held the applicable 
Statute of Limitations was two years and respondent's Motion 
for Sunnnary Judgment was denied (R.27). 
A Request for Trial Setting (R.28) was filed on 
August 7, 1979 and by Stipulation and Order (R.29-30) the 
original trial setting of November 15, 1979 was vacated. 
Prior to the rescheduled non-jury trial setting of 
January 22, 1980, appellant advised her counsel that she would 
not be able to appear on January 22, 1980 because of appellant's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possible involvement in an administrative hearing being 
conducted in Las Vegas, Nevada, appellant's place of residence. 
A telephone conference call between counsel for the respective 
parties and the Court was conducted on January 21, 1980, at 
·which time appellant's counsel requested a continuance of the 
trial for the stated reason, " ... that plaintiff was unable to 
appear inasmuch as she lives in Las Vegas, Nevada and was to 
be involved unexpectedly in an administrative hearing sometime 
during the week of January 21, (1980)". R.32). 
On the day set for trial, appellant's counsel appeared 
before the Court and removed the motion for a continuance 
because of appellant's absence (R.37). The motion was again 
denied by the Court (R.38) and when appellant's counsel was 
unable to proceed, counsel for the respondent moved for a 
dismissal with prejudice (R.38). Appellant's counsel requested 
that an order of dismissal be without prejudice; however, the 
Court granted the dismissal, " ... on the merits", and the Order 
of Dismissal dismissed appellant's complaint with prejudice 
(R.33). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL SETTING 
- 4 -
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BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INABILITY TO PERSONALLY BE AND 
APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT ON THE DATE AND AT THE TI~IB SET 
FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL. 
As pertinent to this proceeding, Rule 40(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
"Upon motion of a party, the Court may its 
discretion, and u on such terms as ma ·ust, 
inc u ing t e payment o costs occas one y 
such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding 
upon good cause shown." 
Appellant initially recognizes the discretionary 
authority of a trial court in disposing of motions relating 
to the continuance of a trial setting; however, appellant 
respectfully submits that the Order of Dismissal entered by 
the lower court in this proceeding constituted an abuse of the 
vested discretion. The recital set forth in the Statement of 
Facts above clearly establishes that the proceedings before 
the lower court were prosecuted with due diligence without the 
inner position of delaying tactics or maneuvers by either side 
of the controversy. Both parties took full advantage of the 
discovery procedures and proceeded in an expeditious manner. 
By refusing to grant a continuance, the lower court overemphasis~ 
the inability of appellant to be and personally appear before 
the court on the date set for trial and unjustly penalized 
appellant for this one breach in an otherwise order procedure. 
In Bairas vs. Johnson, 13 U2d 269, 373 P2d 375 (1962), 
- 5 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this court reversed a lower court's denial of a motion for 
a continuance and stated at 373 P2d 377, 378: 
"Rule 40(b) U.R.C.P. provides that a granting of 
a continuance lies in the trial court's discretion. 
This case presents one of those difficult instances 
in which it is necessary to examine the reasonableness 
of the exercise of that discretion. Certainly, this 
court should not reverse the ruling of the trial 
court absent a showing that the latter abused its 
discretion. However, it is in accord with the 
most fundamental traditions of our legal system 
that a party should be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial. 
"Obviously, there may be times when a party may 
be able to add little or nothing by way of assistance 
or testimony at a trial, and in such an instance 
there may be little reason to grant a continuance 
to accomodate an absent party. But such is not 
the instant case. The plaintiff's testimony is 
essential to his case." 
Appellant actively pursued the discovery procedure 
and prepared for an evidentiary presentation in support of 
appellant's position. The denial of appellant's motion for a 
continuance unjustly deprived appellant of the opportunity to 
be heard with respect to appellant's alleged grievance and 
present testimony and other evidence in support thereof. Had 
appellant unduly protracted the proceedings as in First Security 
Bank vs. Johnson, 540 P2d 521 (1975) or that appellant had been 
dilatory in responding to respondent's efforts at discovery 
and resisted attempts to resolve the issues as in Maxfield vs. 
Fishler, 538 P2d 1323 (1975), appellant would not be pursuing 
- 6 -
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this appeal. However, where the record is supportive and 
illustrative of appellant's efforts to resolve the issues 
but is precluded from appearing because of a potential involve-
ment in an out-of-state administrative hearing, a denial of 
a motion for continuance with the resulting dismissal of 
appellant's action, clearly constitutes an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE OF 
APPELLANT'S INABILITY TO PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL. 
provided, 
The Order of Dismissal (R.32,33) specifically 
" ... that the Complaint of the Plaintiff of the 
above entitled action be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice." (R.33) 
By dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice, 
the lower court abused its discretion by precluding appellant 
from refiling an appropriate complaint. 
provides: 
Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
"If any action is commenced within due time and 
a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, 
or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon 
a cause of action otherwise and upon the merits, 
and the time limited either by law or contract 
for commencing the same shall have expired, the 
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plaintiff ... may connnence a new action within 
one year after the reversal or failure." 
Emphasis added. 
The issue thus becomes whether the circumstances 
giving rise to the dismissal of appellant's complaint justified 
a dismissal with prejudice so as to operate as an adjudication 
on merits and deprive appellant of the benefits of Section 
78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Appellant concedes that there may be appropriate 
circumstances that would justify a dismissal with prejudice 
with the finality desired by respondent; however, in this 
proceeding, appellant actively pursued the prosecution of her 
claim to the particular date set for trial and which precluded 
from being in attendance at the trial for reasons and respons-
ibilities not within appellant's control. Accordingly, appellant 
should have been allowed the opportunity to comply with Section 
78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and obtain an 
adjudication of her claim on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, the order of the 
lower court denying appellant's motion for a continuance should 
be reversed and the matter remanded for a full trial on the 
merits, or, in the alternative, the Order of Dismissal should 
- 8 -
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be reversed to the extent that the same dismisses appellant's 
complaint with prejudice so that appellant may bring another 
action pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-12-40 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of May, 
GARY A. FRANK 
Attorney for Appellant 
5085 South State 
Murray, Utah 
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